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Indians fishing , Moricetown, British Columbia, 1901. While the information accompanying these photographs in the archives does not specify
whether the persons in them are Gitxasn or Wet'suwet'en, they probably are, as the photographs were taken within the territories of those
nations.
B.C. Archives: E-08385.

Legalizing Oral History:
Proving Aboriginal Clai1ns in
Canadian Courts

L

ARGE AREAS OF Canada are still subject to
land claims by the Aboriginal peoples, who
include the Indian, Inuit, and Metis. These
claims arise mafoly in regions where land-surrender
treaties were not signed in the past, notably in British
Columbia, Quebec, the Atlantic Provinces, and the
North. Most of them get resolved through negotiation
and agreement, but a few end up in court. When that
happens, the onus is on the Aboriginal peoples to prove
their claims in accordance with the requirements of the
Canadian legal system. This article will examine some
of the difficu lties Aboriginal peoples encounter when
they rely on their oral histories for this purpose.

Lori Ann Roness and Kent McNeil

Convincing a Canadian court of the existence of an
Aboriginal .right can be a formidable task, largely because Aboriginal rights are derived from use and occupation of lands by the Aboriginal peoples as organized
societies prior to the colonization of North A merica by
Europeans. So proof of Aboriginal rights, and of Aboriginal title to land in particular, requires evidence of this
use and occupation. Because the onus of proof is on the
Aboriginal peoples, they have to establish their prior use
and occupation on a balance of probabilities, i.e., b~
producing evidence sufficient to convince a court tha_t tt
is more probable than not that they used and occup1ed
the claimed lands at the requisite time. Depending on the
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Map of British Columbia showing Territory claimed by the Gitxsan
and Wet'suwet'en Nations (not to scale), reproduced from
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, Reasons for Judgment of Chief
Justice Allan McEachem, March 8, 1991 , page 6.

Indians drying cooked berries, Moricetown, British Columbia, ca. 1900.
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location of the claim, in some cases this can involve
proving use and occupation almost 400 years ago.
Compounding the difficulty of proving use and occupation so long ago is the fact that pre-contact Aboriginal
societies in what is now Canada were generally non-literate. They did not keep written records, so they cannot
provide a court with the kind of documentation judges
are used to seeing in cases involving title to land.
Instead, they have to rely on other evidence. This can
include post-contact written records, such as journal
entries and accounts by European explorers and traders,
and testimony by experts, such as archaeologists and
anthropologists. However, where written records do
exist, they often do not contain adequate information on
Aboriginal use and occupation of land and tend to be
tainted by the European perspective of the persons who
produced them. Archaeological and anthropological evidence, while less likely to be biased, can also be quite
inadequate. So most Aboriginal claimants are obliged to
rely heavily on oral accounts of their history maintained
by elders and other persons who are responsible for
safeguarding and transmitting this knowledge from generation to generation. Unless these oral histories are
admitted in court and given adequate weight by judges
in Aboriginal rights cases, few Aboriginal claims will
succeed.
The Supreme Court of Canada bas acknowledged the
difficulty of proving Aboriginal claims and has directed
that impossible burdens of proof should not be placed on

8.C. Archives A·06215
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Aboriginal claimants. For example, in Simon v. The
Queen, a case involving hunting rights stemming from a
1752 treaty signed in Nova Scotia between the Micmac
Indians and the British Crown, Chief Justke Brian Dickson, for a unanimous Court, said this:
The Micmacs did not keep written records. Micmac traditions are largely oral in nature. To impose
an impossible burden of proof would, in effect,
render nugatory any right to hunt that a presentday Shubenacadie Micmac Indian would otherwise be entitled to invoke based on this Treaty.•
Similarly, in R. v. Van der Peet, Chief Justice Antonio
Larner cautioned that, in determining whether a claim to
an Aboriginal right has been proven (in that case a fishirng right),
... a court should approach the rules of evidence,
and interpret the evidence that exists, with a consciousness of the special nature of aboriginal
claims, and of the evidentiary difficulties in proving a right which originates in times where there
were no written records of the practices, customs
and traditions engaged in. The courts must not
undervalue the evidence presented by aboriginal
claimants simply because that evidence does not
conform precisely with the evidentiary standards
that would be applied in, for example, a private
law torts case.2
One of the rules of evidence that has presented particular difficulty in the context of Aboriginal c laims is
the hearsay rule. Briefly stated, the rule excludes second-band evidence, as when a person testifies about
what another person has said. That testi mony is only
admissible as evidence that the statements were made by
the other person, not as evidence of their truth. For example, if John testified in court that Mary told him that
she bad seen Bill steal a car, that testimony would only
be admissible as proof that Mary actually told him that.
It would be inadmissible as proof that Bill had stolen the
car. The main reasons for the rule are that hearsay can be
unreliable and that it is not the best obtainable evidence.
As the person who made the statement did not do so under oath, and is not subject to cross-examination, those
means of ensuring truthfulness are unavailable to the
court. So for Mary's eyewitness account to be admissible, as a general rule Mary would have to appear in
court and give testimony herself, as that would provide
the best evidence of what she saw.3
As the oral histories of Aboriginal peoples are passed
on from generation to generation, from the perspective
of the rules of evidence applied by Canadian courts they
are largely hearsay. The actual witnesses of most of the
recounted events are dead, and thus are unavailable to
give direct evidence themselves. However, in situations

Indian women packers, Moricetown, British Columbia,

ca. 1900.

B.C. Archives A-0606

of this kind, the courts have created exceptions to the
hearsay rule by admitting second-hand accounts of
statements by deceased persons in certain circumstances. The broad criteria for admissibility under these
exceptions are necessity and the probability of trustworthiness. The necessity requirement is met by the fact that
the person who actually witnessed the event is dead, and
no one else is available to give evidence that is as good.
The trustworthiness element depends on the context.
Among other things, a court looks at when the statement
was made (if after litigation was initiated, it is suspect),
and considers whether the deceased person had any reason, such as an interest in the matter, to be untruthful.
Both necessity and trustworthiness are determined by
the application of common sense and experience by the
triaJ judge.
Declarations by deceased persons can be admitted
under two specific exceptions to the hearsay rule when
they relate to either reputation or pedigree. Reputation
can involve, among other things, community acknowledgement of the existence of public or general rights, i.e.
rights held by the entire populace or a particular segment of it. Pedigree relates to declarations about family
genealogy and history, such as relationships and dates of
births, marriages, and deaths.
While the oral histories of the Aboriginal peoples are
undoubtedly hearsay, they can be admitted as declarations of deceased persons under recognized exceptions
to the hearsay rule. As Aboriginal rights to land are
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communal in nature, they generally come within the
categories of publ ic or general rights that can be proven
by declarations of reputation. Moreover, as kinship is
integral to the social structures and distribution of entitlements within many Aboriginal cornmunjties, the
pedigree exception can be relied upon as well in appropriate circumstances.
This brings us Lo Delgamuukw v. British Columbia ,~ a
landmark Aboriginal title case that was decided by the
Supreme Court of Canada in December 1997. The trial
in that case, which began ten years earlier, was the longest and most complex in Canadian hist0ry, requiring 3 18
days for presentation of evidence, and a further 56 days
for the lawyers to make their legal arguments. It involved a claim by the Gitxsan (spelled Gitksan in the
judgments) and Wet'suwet'en Nations to ownershjp and
jurisdiction over their traditional territories, encompassing about 22,000 square miles in north-central British
Columbia (see map). The ownership claim in particular
depended on proof that the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet' en
had been in occupation of the claimed territories prior to
British colonization of the region in the 19th century.'
The issue of admissibility of oral histories as evidence was addressed by the trial judge, Allan McEachem, who was then the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of British Columbia, in a preliminary judgment
released in 1987.6 He decided that testimony relating to
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the oraJ histories of the Git~san and Wet'suwet'en was
generally admissible under hearsay rule exceptions
relating to declarations of deceased persons, so long as
it involved events that occurred before living memory.
In the absence of proof that direct evidence by living
witnesses was not available, more recent oral history
consisting of second-hand accounts would not be admissible. But McEachem also struggled with more profound issues of what amounts to "history," and whether
all aspects of oral history qualify as such. In this context,
he drew a distinction between historical "facts" and
"anecdotes," e.g., where the evidence related to legendary events such as the destruction of a village "by a
huge supernatural grizzly bear that bad been angered by
maidens using the spines of fi sh as items of personal
decoration."7
Chief Justice McEachern did not purport to resolve
these complex issues in his preliminary judgment on
admissibility. However, he did say that he preferred "to
lean towards admissibility," and thus expressed his willingness to listen to the oral histories generally, with the
qualification that "questionable evidence will be received subject to a later determination of admissibility."8
And he naturally reserved judgment on what might actually be proved by the evidence, as that would depend on
the evidence itself and the weight he attached to it.
At the end of the long trial, Chief Justice McEachern
produced a book-length judgment in which he dismissed
virtua1Jy all the claims that the Gi~san and Wet'suwet' en had made. In thls article, however, our focus is
not on the substance of his judgment, but on his treatment of the oral histories. 9 McEachern devoted one part
of his judgment to what he cal led "Some Comments on
Evidence." In those comments, he expressed his frustration at the impossibility of separating "what Europeanbased culture would call mythology and ' real' matters."10 Contrary to his earlier hope, by the time he wrote
ills judgment he had come to the conclusion that this distinction was "overly simplistic."11 He also had to face
the fact that many of the social and other scientists who
gave evidence as experts relied in part on oral histories
to buttress the scarce evidence which exists about
the social order and identity of the occupants of the
territory prior to and in the early period after contact.12

Totem pole, Kispiox, British Columbia, 1899. Photographer V. H.
Dupont.
National Archives of Canada, PA-117168

However, he did not change the view be had expressed
in his earlier judgment on the admissibility of the oral
histories as declarations of deceased persons, "subject to
objection and weigbt." 13
We saw earlier that trustworthiness is an underlying
requirement for adnllssibility of declarations of deceased persons. But while Chief Justice McEachern did
decide that the oral histories were generally admissible,
he did not really find them to be trustworthy. He relied,
for example, on a work by a leading Canadjan ethnohis-
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torian, where the author, Professor Bruce Trigger, cautioned:
The scientific study of oral traditions is obviously an exacting task and requires a careful evaluation of the reliability of sources. the identification of stereotyped motifs that may distort historical evidence, the checking of the stories told by
one group against comparable information supplied by others, and, finally, the checking of these
stories against independent sources of information
such as archaeological evidence.

Used in rhis way, oral traditions may supply
valuable information about the not too distant
past. Used uncritically, however, they can be a
source of much confusion and misunderstanding in
prehistoric studies. 14 [McEachern 's emphasis]
McEachern was concerned as well about the way culture
was interwoven with the oral histories. He observed that
"Indian culture also pervades the evidence at this trial
for nearly every word of testimony, given by expert and
lay witnesses, bas both a factual and a cultural perspective."1s He found as well that
the fact that the plaintiffs' claim
has been so much discussed for
so many years, and the further
fact that so much of the evidence
was assembled communally in
anticipation of litigation, or even
during this litigation, is a fac t
whic h must be taken into account.16
For these reasons, McEachem concluded that the oral histories, unless collaborated, generally could not be relied
upon to establish historical fact. His
position is summed up in the following
passage:

Indian carrying bundle of skins, Kispiox, British Columbia, 1899. Photographer V. H.
Dupont.
National Archives of Canada, PA-117169

When I come to consider events
long past, I am driven to conclude,
on all the evidence, that much of
the plaintiffs' historical evidence is
not literally true. For example, I do
not accept the proposition that
these peoples have been present on
this land from the beginning of
time. Serious questions arise about
many of the matters about which
the witnesses have testified and I
must assess the tota lity of the evidence in accordance with Legal,
1101 cultural principles.
I am satisfied that the lay witnesses honestly believed everything they said was true and accurate. It was obvious to me, however, that very often they were
recounting matters of faith which
have become fact to them. If I do
not accept their evidence it will
seldom be because I think they are
untruthful, but rather because I

have a different view ofwhat isfact
Nat ive girls in boat on Skeena River, Kitwauga, British Columbia, 1915. Photographer
William James Topley.
National Archives of Canada, PA-011227

and what is belief'7 [emphasis
addecfJ
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However, when it came to considering the evidence
presented by non-Aboriginal historians, Chief Justice
McEachem took a very different approach. ln reference
to them, he said this:
Generally speaking, I accept just about eve1ything
1'1ey put before me because they were largely collectors of archival, historical documents. In most
cases they provided much useful information with
minimal editorial comment. Their marvelous collections largely spoke for themselves. 18 [emphasis
added]
McEachero's bias in favor of the written word is clearly
evident in this passage. It appears in other parts of his
judgment as well. For example, he gave much more credence to written reports prepared for the Hudson's Bay
Company by William Brown, who established the
Company's first post in the region on Babine Lake in
1822, than he gave to the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet' en's
oral histories. McEachem referred to Brown's reports as
"a rich source of historical information about the people
he encountered both at his fort and on his travels," and
added: "I have no hesitation accepting the information
contained in them." 19 While discounting the reliability of
the oral bfatories because they contained cultural elements, he displayed little awareness that the observations recorded in Brown's reports might have been just
as influenced by the trader's cultural perspective.
Chief Justice McEachem's judgment was appealed to
the British Columbia Court of Appeal, where certain
aspects of it were overturned and others affirmed. 211 The
case then went to the Supreme Court of Canada. Instead
of ruling on the substantive issues, that Court laid down
some broad principles of law relating to Aboriginal land
rights, and ordered a new trial. One reason the Supreme
Court declined to decide the substantive issues was that
the way the case bad originally been pleaded and the
way it was finally argued were different. But the Court
gave another reason as well that relates directly to our
discussion, namely, that McEachem's treatment of the
oral histories was so misguided that bis factual findings
could not stand. Writing the leading judgment, Antonio
Lamer, the Chief Justice of Canada, put it this way:

Indians, Hazelton, British Columbia, 1907-1912.
National Archives of Canada, PA-095750

So how did McEachem go wrong? According to

evidence presented by them. Relying on his own decision in Van der Peet, and io particular on the passage
from that judgment quoted earlier in this article,22 Lamer
said that the sui generis nature of Aboriginal rights and
the "evidentiary difficulties inherent in adjudicating
aboriginal claims . .. demand a unique approach to the
treatment of evidence which accords due weight to the
perspective of aboriginal peoples," while preserving
"the Canadian legal and constitutional structure." 23 Jn
practical terms, according due weight to Aboriginal perspectives "requires the courts to come to terms with the
oral histories of aboriginal societies, which, for many
aboriginal nations, are the only record of their past."24
At the same time, Chief Justice Lamer acknowledged
some of the difficulties and challenges presented by use
of oral histories in a court of law. Not only are they
largely hearsay, but they also have a "broad social role
not only 'as a repository of historical knowledge for a

Chief Justice Lamer, he did not pay sufficient attention

culture,' but also as an expression of 'the values and

to the perspective of the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en in
applying the rules of evidence and in interpreting the

mores of [that] culture. "'2.1 Lamer also quoted from an
earlier Supreme Court decision where fostice Brian

The trial judge, after refusing to admit, or giving
no independent weight to these oral histories,
reached the conclusion that the appellants had not
demonstrated the requisite degree of occupation
for "ownership." Had the trial judge assessed the
oral histories correctly, his conclusions on these
issues of fact might have been very different. 21
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Wet'suwet' en witnesses nor the scientists who gave
expert evidence made this distinction, McEachem realized that he was incapable of telling the difference.
However, as we have seen, this difficulty led him to discount the value of the oral histories, unless corroborated
by other evidence, because he found them to be unreliable. On appeal, Chief Justice Lamer criticized him for
this:
Although he [McEachern] had earlier recognized, when making his ruling on admissibility,
that it was impossible to make an easy distinction
between the· mytho1ogica) and "real" aspects of
these oral histories, he discounted the adaawk and
kungax [special forms of Giqsan and Wetsuwet' en oral history] because they were not "literally true," confounded "what is fact and what is
belief," "included some material which might be
classified as mythology," and projected a "romantic view" of the history of the appellants. 30

Indian totem pole, Hazelton, British Columbia, 1910.
National Archives of Canada, PA-095506

Dickson (later Chief Justice of Canada) had said that
"[c]laims to aboriginal title are woven with history, legend, politics and moral obligations."Ui As Lamer noted,
[t]he difficulty with these features of oral histories
is that they are tangential to the ultimate purpose
of the fact-finding process at trial - the determination of the historical truth. 27
But notwithstanding these difficulties, Lamer stated that
the laws of evidence must be adapted in order that
this type of evidence can be accommodated and
placed on an equal footing with the types of historical evidence that courts are familiar with,
which largely consists of historical documents. 28
At this point, it is worth recalling that Chief Justice
McEachern was aware of the need to separate the historical facts imbedded in oral histories from what be
called mythological and cultural elements. But after
318 days of hearing evidence, he confessed that he
was unable to do so, as he found the distinction itself
to be "overly simplistic."29 As neither the Gitxsan and

Lamer also noted that McEachern bad questioned the
validity and utility of those oral histories because they
were "confined to the communities whose histories they
were and because those oral histories were insufficiently detailed." 31 Instead of discounting them for these
reasons, Lamer instructed that the oral histories should
have been placed on an "equal footing" with other kinds
of historical evidence.32. But how exactly are trial judges
to do this if they cannot distinguish between historical
fact on the one hand, and legend, myth, and cultural
values on the other? Or was Chief Justice Lamer suggesting that oral histories could be placed on an equal
footing without distinguishing these various elements?
Unfortunately, Lamer did not answer these questions.
Summarizing his views on this matter, he simply said
this:
The implication of the trial judge's reasoning is
that oral histories should never be given any independent weight and are only useful as confirmatory evidence in aboriginal rights litigation. I fear
that if this reasoning were followed, the oral histories of aboriginal peoples would be consistently
and systematically undervalued by the Canadian
legal system, in contradiction of the express
instruction to the contrary in Van der Peet that trial
courts interpret the evidence of aboriginal peoples
in light of the difficulties inherent in adjudicating
aboriginal claims.33
With respect, these general directions are unlikely to be
of much assistance to trial judges who want to give
equal weight to oral histories but are unsure how to do
so.34
At the root of the problem are fundamental differences between the world views of Aboriginal societies
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and of Anglo-Canadian society, both generally and in
the legal context. At the outset of the Delgamuukw case,
the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en recognized this, and
attempted to explain it to Chief Justice McEachem in
the opening address of their lawyers to the court. One of
the challenges facing the court, the lawyers said, was to
avoid the "natural tendency .. . to look at Indian societies using a model of the world that derives from
Western concepts of the nature of the world and society. ·•3s In a passage that deserves to be quoted at length,
they described some of the fundamental differences:
The Western world view sees the essential and
primary interactions as being those between
human beings. To the Gitksan and Wet'suwet' en,
human beings are part of an interacting continuum
which includes animals and spirits. Animals and
fish are viewed as members of societies who have
intelligence and power, and can influence the
course of events in terms of their interrelationship
with human beings. In Western society causality is
viewed as direct and Hnear. That is to say. that an
event has the ability to cause or produce another
event as time moves forward. To the Gitksan and
Wet'suwet' en, time is not linear but cyclical. The
events of the "past" are not simply history but are
something that directly effects [sic] the present and
the future. 36
They went on to explain how, in the Gitxsan and
Wet'suwet'en cosmologies, failure by humans to show
due respect for the bones of animals can prevent those
animals from being reincarnated and returning to offer
themselves to humans, causing a loss of vital sources of
food. They continued:
It is important to reflect on how such a view of
causality would be rendered conceptually from
within a Western framework. Such a view would
not be regarded as "scientific" and such attribution
of events to the powers of animals or spirits would
be characterized as mythical. Both of these adjectives imply that what Indian people believe is not
real or, at least, if it is real for them, it represents
primitive mentality, pre-scientific thinking, which
is to say, magic. On either basis, Indian reality is
denied or devalued. Their history is not real history but mythology. 31 [emphasis addedJ
This takes us to the crux of the problem. From some
of the passages in McEachern's judgment quoted above,
it is apparent that he did regard most of the oral histories
of the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en as mythology. In spite
of the lawyers' warnings, he does not seem to have been
able to escape what they called the "natural tendency" to
view the evidence of the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en
lhrough the lens of his own culture. But is it ever possi-
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ble to escape the confines of one's culture entirely, when
such fundamental concepts as time, causality, history,
and even the content of reality itself, are involved? After
years of training, anthropologists may come closer to
accomplishing this than most of us, but should we really be expecting j udges to do so? And even if they could
accomplish it, how would they then come to a decision?
ls there really some way of balancing Aboriginal and
Euro-Canadian perspectives, as Chief Justice Lamer
suggested, when those perspectives reflect radically different world views?
These are complex and difficult questions, which we
do not purport to be able to answer here. Part of the
problem stems from the fact that Aboriginal peoples
who seek adjudicated solutions to their Aboriginal
claims are obliged to go to Canadian courts, which have
to apply Canadian law. That law reflects the world views
of Euro-Canadians, not of Aboriginal peoples. So no
matter how sympathetic the judges may be and how
willing they are to take account of Aboriginal perspecti ves, at the end of the day their decisions must be made
in a manner that, in Chief Justice Lamer 's words, "does
not strain ' the Canadian legal and constitutional structure. "'38 To a large extent, their hands are tied by the role
they are obliged to play.
At the beginning of this article, we observed that
most Aboriginal land claims are in fact resolved by
negotiation and agreement, rather than by the courts. In
negotiations, the parties are not limited by the confines
of Canadian law and can thus take account of divergent
realities and perspectives in reaching mutually agreeable
compromises. So in the context of negotiations, oral histories can be used without having to distinguish between
their historical and cultural elements. However, negotiatio ns depend on willing participants. Jn British
Columbia, until 1990, the provincial government steadfastly refu sed to negotiate Aboriginal land claims
because it did not ackno wledge the existence of
Aboriginal title. So prior to that time, the Gitxsan and
Wet'suwet'en had little choice but to go to court. Also,
even where non-Aboriginal governments do participate
in negotiations, they clearly have the advantage of superior resources and bargaining power. This is one reason
the courts, while not the best forum for resolving
Aboriginal claims, still have an important role to play.
By affirming the existence of Aboriginal rights and
drawing some parameters within which negotiations can
take place, the courts have pushed non-Aboriginal governments toward negotiations and have helped to level
the playing field.
So the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en are now presented
with the difficult choice of either re-litigating their
claims or entering into negotiations. Should they go
back to court, they will face the costs of another lengthy
trial, where they will again have to rely on their oral histories to prove their Aboriginal title. While Chief Justice
Lamer bas indicated that trial judges have " to come to

74 -

JOW, Summer 2000, Vol. 39, No. 3

terms with the oral histories of aboriginal societies" and
accord "due weight to the perspective of aboriginal
peoples,"39 it remains to be seen how this wiJI be done in
the context of a Canadian courtroom.
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